Derrida participated in a discussion to mark the opening of a new doctoral programme in the philosophy department at the University of Villanova. On two occasions he tells his audience that the next day his latest work, Politics of Friendship, will be published in Paris: it is the day before the politics of friendship. Derrida goes on to say that his new work is 'mainly a book on Plato and Aristotle' and adds, 'I think we need to read them again and again and I feel that, however old I am, I am on the threshold of reading Plato and Aristotle. I love them and I feel I have to start again and again and again. It is a task which is in front of me, before me'. Derrida reiterates not once but five times that when it comes to Plato and Aristotle one must start again -and again and again. At the same time, in Of Spirit Derrida had also insisted that 'it is already too late, always too late'. One cannot, and must not, be beguiled by the possibility of a pure 'recommencement', by a 'return' that would 'signify a new departure … or some degree zero'. It is always too late to start again.
As Derrida argues at the end of On Touching, one must attend to both the logic and the rhetoric, 'which would be more than a rhetoric', of touching on touch (299). Reading Lévinas on the equivocal caress, he writes: 'This does not forbid the promise but makes us call into question again, once more, all the analyses of the promise and its performative value' (83). And later, still in the first part of the work: 'I therefore return -I turn around, toward Jean-Luc Nancy' (93); or, 'we turn … from one "turn" towards other "turns" ' (130).
''May I', he asks at the opening of the first part, 'even before starting out again, be permitted the space and the freedom of a long parenthesis ' (20, my emphasis) . A hundred and twenty pages later, at the opening of the second part, Derrida writes: 'Let us start again' (160). And again in Tangent V: 'Let us start over again ' (244) . And perhaps most of all in the third part, 'Punctuations: "And you" ', when he pleads: 'Make believe I'm starting over again, since I obviously and avowedly have the feeling I can never get to it, to the truth, and I can never touch the point of departure, not to mention the end' (277).
I. THE DIAPHANOUS
It is appropriate that Derrida's first quotation of Aristotle, in his introduction to The Origin of Geometry, is from De Anima. It is crucial to phenomenology, Derrida argues, that Husserl excludes the 'Idea in the Kantian sense' itself from the phenomenological analysis.
Phenomenology is concerned both with what appears and with 'the possibility of its appearing'. The 'Idea in the Kantian sense' -'the regulative possibility of appearing' -is the standard and guarantee of phenomenology. What interests Derrida is that, as the "origin" of phenomenology, the Idea itself 'can never appear as such'. It is to illustrate this point that Derrida first turns to De Anima. He writes:
It is not by chance that there is no phenomenology of the Idea. The latter cannot be given in person, nor determined in an evidence, for it is only the possibility of evidence and the openness of "seeing" itself; it is only determinability as the horizon for every intuition in general, the invisible milieu of seeing analogous to the diaphaneity of the Aristotelian Diaphanous, an elemental third, but the one source of the seen and the visible.
The 'diaphanousness of pure ideality', Derrida goes on to say, is for Husserl the invisible origin of the visible as a pure objective ideality, of a visible that has liberated itself from the sensible and the imaginary. A year later in 'Force and Signification', Derrida argues that 'diaphanousness is the supreme value' of phenomenology.
In the opening of On Touching, of 'Signing a question -from Aristotle', Derrida turns back once more and more than once to many ghosts in asking about the place, space or interval of 'the day's phenomenality and its diaphanous visibility' (3). There is the apparent choice, the phenomenological choice par excellence, that has to be made between seeing and the visible which leads Derrida to gesture -without the hand, if such a thing is possible -to both seeing and the visible, to 'both your gaze and your eyes': always somewhere in between (2-3).
In the opening pages of On Touching, there is also perhaps a fragmentary echo of Derrida's unpublished 1967 seminar on sensible certitude in the Phenomenology of Spirit (61-2). In responding to the unavoidable hospitality of the question from Aristotle 'is it daytime or are we already inhabiting our night?', Derrida evokes Hegel's trial in which writing is used in the attempt to preserve the truth, like a night storage, to keep language safe from the oscillations of sensible certainty. There is also perhaps a distant blow or caress, In his account of sound, hearing and the voice in De Anima Aristotle attempts to resolve a problem that arises in the senses between matter and form, and as Derrida suggests, it is only when he turns to touch that Aristotle will appear to solve this problem. For Aristotle, actual sound requires that there is always more than one body: 'it is impossible for one body only to generate a sound. There must be 'an impact', something 'striking against something else'. A thing 'must be struck with a sudden sharp blow, if it is to sound' (419b). For Aristotle, hearing contains this violence, but it in no way diminishes it. The 'air chamber' inside the ear retains the 'sudden sharp blow' that has come from outside (420a). But hearing remains reliant on that fact that there must always be something 'striking against something else', something outside. Aristotle attempts to counteract this reliance through the voice. Voice is 'the impact of the inbreathed air against the windpipe' and the soul is 'the agent that produces the impact'. In other words, the soul is the author of an internal violence that makes the voice possible. This violence of the soul must guarantee that the necessary violence of 'something else', of something outside, can lead only to an articulate voice, to a voice with meaning: 'what produces the impact must have soul in it and must be accompanied by an act of imagination, for voice is a sound with meaning' (420b).
As is well known, in the 1960s and early 1970s Derrida challenged this Aristotelian legacy. Lévinas, he argued, treats 'the sound of thought as intelligible speech' and hearing as an ideality that surpasses the sensibility of sound, while Hegel perpetuates the logic of 'the invisible ideality of a logos which-hears-itself-speak'. The diaphanous will always privilege the ear over the eye. From Aristotle to Hegel and beyond, Derrida argued, the eardrum is at once an internal buffer that regulates and orders the sudden sharp blows of the outside on the inside, and a membrane that cannot stop vibrating and registering something -always more than one body -'striking against something else', something outside. The Aristotelian ear, that fabulous Greek machine designed 'to balance internal pressures and external pressures', cannot stop registering 'the blows from the outside' (les coups du dehors).
II. EXACTITUDE
As Derrida suggests, long before it became a 'master word' for Nancy, the elusive balance of the ear and the authority of the diaphanous is founded on the immaculate birth of exactness, and it is touch that gives the highest exactness to humans: 'While in respect of all the other senses we fall below many species of animals', Aristotle writes, 'in respect of touch we far excel all other species in exactness of discrimination. This is why man is the most intelligent of animals' (421a). Touch is a sign of intelligence, it accounts for the human capacity for 'exactness of discrimination'. First and foremost, touch describes the capacity to arrive at an exact -an ideal and pure -difference.
For Aristotle, the sense of touch is founded on a fundamental and exact distinction between form and matter. 'A sense', he writes 'is what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter' (424a). Unlike plants, which cannot make a distinction between the form and matter of sensible objects, from the start we have made an exact discrimination, and not only separated but also excluded matter from the senses (424b).
The five senses in general, Aristotle argues, form a unified apparatus of exact discrimination.
Each sense is a ratio, a balancing mechanism that avoids the extremes (the too bright or too dark, the too loud or too quiet, the too hot or too cold) that leave one senseless. The senses are a unity that 'discriminates the differences' and avoids excess (426b). This wondrous machine, this five-in-one, is the work of the soul, the psyche.
For Aristotle, this need for the form of a medium or media is inherent in each sense.
Poised between extremes (too bright, too loud) seeing and hearing require that there is no 'immediate contact' with an object. If something is lying on the eye or ear it cannot be seen or heard. For the senses to work, there must be 'something in between' (419a). 'The same, in spite of all appearances', Aristotle argues, 'applies also to touch and taste' (419a).
Because there are a number of different kinds of tangible perceptions, as Derrida points out, (taste and touch, the tongue and the skin) and because of the human capacity for 'exactness of discrimination', the source of touching and of its ability to mediate is more than the flesh and is 'situated farther inward' (422b). Aristotle warns that we cannot use 'contact with the flesh' to reach -to touch -the internal origins of touching, and he illustrates this by noting that if a kind of prosthetic skin were attached or even grafted to the body it would still tell us little about the fine discriminations of touching (422b-423a). In other words, as Derrida implies, Aristotle takes account of, counts on tekhne in his treatment of touch.
'We perceive everything through a medium', Aristotle writes, but the medium of touch is distinctive (423b). When it comes to touching, 'we are affected not by but along with the medium' (423b). The medium is part of the message. Returning to the problem of the unavoidable sudden sharp blow from the outside in his account of seeing, hearing and speaking, Aristotle describes this unique inclusion of the medium in the sense as the violent reverberation of a shield being struck: 'it is as if a man were struck through his shield, where the shock is not first given to the shield and passed on to the man, but the concussion of both is simultaneous'. When it comes to hearing, the 'air chamber' of the ear mediates the medium and the inside balances the force of the blow from the outside. When it comes to touch, however, there is it seems no time for such a natural homeostasis. Touching is what happens when the external blow hits the outside and the inside simultaneously. Touch is a simultaneous concussion of the external and the internal.
As Derrida suggests, Aristotle attempts to counteract the force of this argument by turning back to the soul. The flesh is the medium of touch, but the 'power of perceiving the tangible is seated inside' (423b). It is only this power that is 'seated inside' that can mediate, discern and confirm the form-matter, actual-potential dynamic: 'touch has for its object both what is tangible and what is intangible'. But as Derrida points out, in a passage that can also be seen as an oblique criticism of Agamben's celebration of the diaphanous self-sufficiency of potentiality, the fact that sensation 'is only potential' means that sense cannot 'sense itself':
sense 'does not auto-affect itself without the motion of an exterior object' (6). The internal power of touch is, in itself and to itself, insufficient. It is always in need of the other -the other that is outside, and the other that moves.
For Derrida, when it comes to touch there is always the precedence of a gap that moves or, as Nancy suggests, a 'syncopated noncoincidence ' (192) . For there to be place or touch, there 'must be spacing before it is space', there must be 'an interval' that is 'neither sensible nor intelligible' (24). To touch, there must already be gap of and as contact (181, 229) . This is even the case when we try to touch ourselves: 'the I self-touches spacing itself out, losing contact with itself, precisely in touching itself' (34). For Derrida, this irreducible gap, this gaping -as spacing, as the elusive possibility of touching another or oneself -should not be confused with the long tradition of touch as the idealization of the 'other as untouchable' (92). In failing to touch the untouchable other, whatever is reaching out to the other, ultimately, only 'touches itself' and loses contact -with itself (104, 108-9). Touching, one is always touching the (moving gaps of the) other.
For Aristotle, the architecture of a soul filled touching rests on defining it as 'exactness of discrimination'. Since his early readings of Husserl, Derrida had associated exactitude with idealization -with an 'exact and nonsensible ideality' that arises from 'a sensible ideality'.
In 'Le facteur de la vérité ' (1971-1975) , Derrida notes Lacan's evocation of an 'exactitude' that treats literature as 'something that stages and makes visible, with no specific intervention of its own, like a transparent element, a general diaphanousness'. It is perhaps not fortuitous that a few pages before this Derrida makes one of his earliest references to Nancy. For Derrida, Nancy seems to at once to echo the Aristotelian tradition of exactness and to exceed it: 'Nancy is the thinker of the exorbitant and exactitude at the same time'. He is concerned with an 'exorbitant exactitude', an exactitude that remains 'faithful to the excess of the exorbitant'. Derrida will later call this Nancy's 'exact hyperbole ' (26, 46) . For Aristotle, touch as discrimination, as mediation, as life, is predicated on resisting and refusing the destructive force of all 'tangible excess'. 'In the beginning', Derrida argues, 'there is abstinence', but this abstinence is already founded on the possibility of touching the untouchable. Starting with Aristotle, touch cannot avoid the 'hyperdialectical' (touching without touching, contact without contact) and, beyond this, the disturbing hyperbole of touching (the blows and caresses) that exceed both the exact and the inexact (47, 67-9). For Derrida, the philosophies of touch, in particular those post-war French philosophies that responded to the work of Husserl, while never straying that far from the questions of Christianity, are always starting again and always too late with Aristotle. He writes:
But they already know that this thinking of touch, this thought of what "touching" means, must touch on the untouchable. Aristotle's Peri psuches had already insisted on this: both the tangible and the intangible are the objects of touch.
Once this incredible "truth" has been uttered, it will resonate down to the twentieth century, even within discourses apparently utterly foreign to any Aristotelianism (18).
What distinguishes Nancy, Derrida argues, is an emphasis on prosthetics that attempts to resist the 'the pure life of the living' and the 'immediate continuity' of intuition (19, 56, 127) . At the same time, while Nancy links the possibility of exactitude to the spacing and tekhne of a prosthetics that exceeds the phusis of touch, he also associates it with a certain starting again, with a relaunching, a resurrection or salvation that Derrida treats as a repetition of Aristotelianism that is still prevalent -and perhaps most of all -in Nancy's call for a 'deconstruction of Christianity ' (8, 128-29) The 'deconstruction of Christianity', Derrida argues, begins with 'the Christian body', a seemingly intact and unique body to be deconstructed (218-19). It also presupposes that there is an outside of Christianity, an outside or 'passage beyond itself' that, precisely, Christianity par excellence has always taken account of. Christianity has always had the 'ability to part without parting'. This is an exactitude that always takes account of its own hyperbole: 'For a certain Christianity will always take charge of the most exacting, the most exact, and the most eschatological hyperbole of deconstruction ' (59, 60, 54) .
'Aristotle has not left us for a moment', Derrida insists (47). Aristotle's Peri psuches, he notes, 'begins by explaining to us, at the very outset, what one is to begin with' (18). For Aristotle, the dynamic of matter as that which is always ready and form as that which is always there resolves any apparent problems of precedence. Passive matter can be first, because it is always potential matter. What is always ready (potentiality) is always on its way to what is always there (actuality). As Aristotle observes, 'in the individual, potential knowledge is in time prior to actual knowledge, but absolutely it is not prior even in time' (430a). 'All things', he insists, 'that come into being arise from what actually is' (431a).
Potential matter can be first, because to be potential, it must already start with and start from 'what actually is'. This is the ontology of Aristotle. As Derrida remarks, 'the fullness of immediate presence signifies above all the actuality of what gives itself effectively, energetically, actually' (120). It is because potential knowledge is not prior 'even in time', Aristotle writes, to actual knowledge that 'actual knowledge is identical with its object' (430a). For Aristotle, thought -which is always of and from the soul -is always thinkable, always 'becoming all things', always 'separable, impassible, unmixed', always separable from matter, body and sensation, because 'when separated it is alone just what it is': 'immortal and eternal'. It is the soul. This is where Hegel begins and ends: with a thought that only thinks itself. of the Versammlung, but also the distances and disjunctions of 'the faults, the intervals, the gaps'. In On Touching, which was written not so long after this, Derrida refers to an Auseinandersetzung (21, 36).
In the gaps in the columns of Glas devoted to What is Called Thinking? Derrida writes:
'one can try to displace this necessity only by thinking the remain(s) outside the horizon of essence, outside the thought of being. The remain(s) does not come-to-essence'. The necessity here that 'one can try to displace' refers to the reading of Hegel between the gaps and notches on Heidegger. For Hegel, in the history of spirit the 'content of spirit' can only be spiritual. When thought thinks itself thinking the truth, spirit has always already taken care of the content, of the matter or the weight of thought.
At the Last Supper, Jesus speaks to his disciples at the table, and Derrida asks in Glas, 'What then is Jesus doing when he says while breaking the bread: take this, this is my body given for you, do this in memory of me? Why already memory in the present feeling? Why does he present himself, in the present, before the hour, as cut off from his very own body and following his obsequy?'. When difference is put to work by the Aufhebung in the name of the history of spirit, when copulation is destined for virginity and conception for the immaculate concept, Derrida suggests, thought thinking itself thinking the truth becomes thinking as memory. Derrida here, once again, returns to the problem of the proximity of Erinnerung, Gedächtnis, and Denken, remembering, memory and thought. not help him off with this burden that was upon his back; For as yet he had not got rid thereof, nor could he by any means get it off without help. He told him, As to the burden, be content to bear it, until thou comest to the place of Deliverance; for there it will fall from thy back itself' (29).
For Derrida, in marking the strange and strained relation in French between penser (to think) and peser (to weigh), thinking seems to be neither simply a weighing up, spirit taking account of matter, nor merely a weighing down, matter taking account of spirit, but always evocation of a discordant 'co-appropriation of thinking and weighing' that is indicative of a sense, a sense where existence precedes essence, a sense as 'the without-essence', Derrida suggests that this sense without essence tends to, is co-ordinated by, the exactitude of an inaccessibility which determines 'the whole weight of thought'. Derrida, in contrast, proposes to define 'weight as that which, in touch, is marked as tangible by the opposed resistance … the place of alterity or absolute inappropriability ' (72-74, 295) . He then turns from this marking or definition through the resistance of the other back to thinking: thought, he writes, 'thinks only there where the counterweight of the other weighs enough so that it begins to think, that is, in spite of itself, when it touches or lets itself be touched against its will. That is why it will never think, it will never have begun to think by itself' (299).
Thinking is unthinkable, unweighable, startling even, perhaps because it is already a thinking of and as the senses, an unavoidable accessibility or hospitality even, an interlacing oscillation, a thinking that turns backwards, once more, always more than once, a thinking of palintropes.
In his fifty years of reading On the Soul, Derrida offered what amounts to a 'new' history of the senses (a history that is always à venir), tracing the gaps of and in each of the senses, and the gaps of and between each of the senses: plus de cinq -not only five, more than five, never five-in-one. Derrida's reading of Aristotle in On Touching suggests that we still have yet to interpret 'Bottom's Dream': 'The eye of man hath not heard, the ear of man hath not seen, man's hand is not able to taste, his tongue to conceive, nor his heart to report what my dream was'. 'One day, yes, one day, once upon a time, a terrific time, a time terrifically addressed, with as much violence as tact at its finger tips, a certain question took hold of me'.
